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Abstract
The Society of Automotive Engineers defines five levels of driving automation (LoDA) (plus a “no-automation” level 0). 
Among them, the third level, called “conditional driving automation,” here denoted LoDA 3, performs the complete dynamic 
driving task (DDT) within a limited operational domain. Although the driver is free from any driving task while the automa-
tion is engaged, she is expected to be receptive to an automation-issued request to intervene (RTI) and is also expected to 
perform DDT fallback in a timely manner. This paper gives a method to derive an optimal design for RTI and proves that 
LoDA 3 coupled with the optimal RTI should never be simply called “conditional driving automation.” This means that 
the definition of LoDA 3 is not complete and that at least one important level is missing in the list for LoDAs. This paper 
provides two ways to resolve the problem.
Keywords Automated driving · Levels of driving automation · Request to intervene · Levels of automation · Trading of 
authority · Shared control
1 Introduction
The term “automated driving” has been attracting keen inter-
est worldwide. However, the term can have many different 
meanings. Actually, several varieties can be distinguished 
for automated driving, depending on the scheme of func-
tion allocation between the driver and the automation. If 
the driver forms incorrect mental models of the function 
allocation, various human factor-related problems will arise.
Considerable effort has been made to distinguish catego-
ries of automated driving by institutions, such as the German 
Federal Highway Institute (BASt 2013; Gasser and Westhoff 
2012), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA 2013), and the Society for Automotive Engi-
neers (SAE 2016). Among them, the SAE J3016 standard’s 
definition (SAE 2016) for levels of driving automation 
(LoDA) seems to be gaining popularity as a common lan-
guage to be used worldwide. SAE J3016 distinguishes five 
LoDAs (Table 1). Driver Assistance has been used for many 
years. Partial Driving Automation is expected to be put into 
practical use within a few years. High Driving Automation 
or Full Driving Automation may need some more years 
before legal questions are solved appropriately in related 
countries. Efforts are focused mainly now on Conditional 
Driving Automation or LoDA 3.
SAE J3016 defines LoDA 3 as follows: The automa-
tion performs the complete dynamic driving task (DDT), 
including lateral and longitudinal control as well as object 
and event detection and response (SAE 2016). While the 
automation is engaged, the driver is free from any driving 
task and may be involved in non-driving tasks. However, 
when the automation detects that operational design domain 
limits are about to be exceeded or that there is some DDT 
performance-relevant system failure, the automation issues 
a request to intervene (RTI), with the expectation that the 
driver notices the RTI and intervenes in a timely manner to 
rectify the situation. In other words, the driver is assumed 
to be receptive to an automation-issued RTI and be ready 
to perform DDT fallback (SAE 2016). The SAE-defined 
level 3 driving automation disengages an appropriate time 
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after issuing an RTI, which may impose time pressure on the 
driver. Many studies have been made to investigate takeover-
related issues, such as automation-to-driver transitions of 
control (Lu et al. 2016), time allowance for the driver to take 
over (Gold et al. 2013; Zeeb et al. 2015), driver’s takeover 
performance and its quality (Merat et al. 2014; Zeeb et al. 
2016; Happee et al. 2017), and RTI interface design to assist 
the driver’s maneuver (Petermeijer et al. 2017).
However, there seem to be few studies discussing what 
kind of action the automation should take when the driver 
does not respond properly to an RTI. Is it realistic to assume 
that the driver is always receptive to an automation-issued 
RTI? Is it sensible to expect that the driver is DDT fallback-
ready no matter what are the circumstances when automa-
tion issues an RTI? The driver might fail to notice that an 
RTI was issued, or might fail to grasp and interpret the 
situation properly. The driver might be unable to determine 
what to do in the situation, or might be unable to perform 
what she decided to do. This suggests that an RTI must be 
designed with care by taking into account possibilities that 
the driver can fail to respond to a given RTI within a time 
limit. In such investigations, the following questions should 
be asked: “What needs to be communicated to the driver in 
the RTI?”; “What may the driver do when she feels difficulty 
in taking over control from the automation?”; and “What 
should the automation do when the driver does not respond 
effectively to an RTI?”
This paper proposes a systematic method to generate a list 
of design alternatives of RTI for SAE LoDA 3. It derives an 
“optimal” RTI that yields a maximal value for a utility func-
tion defined as the weighted sum of the benefit derived from 
successful taking over and the cost arising out of the state 
in which the vehicle is controlled neither by the automa-
tion nor by the driver. We show that LoDA 3 coupled with 
the optimal RTI should never simply be called “conditional 
driving automation,” i.e., as a single category. This means 
that Table 1 is incomplete as the list for LoDAs, and that 
an important level is missing there. This paper gives two 
possible ways to resolve the problem: One is to include one 
of the levels discussed in (SAE 2014), the previous version 
of SAE J3016 published in 2016, and the other is to revise 
the definition of LoDA 3 in (SAE 2016) appropriately. Oth-
erwise, LoDA 3 may not be a reasonable objective to be 
translated into reality.
2  Designing messages for a request 
to intervene (RTI)
This section proposes that the generic “levels of automa-
tion” (LoA) concept that has been in the literature for many 
years is useful in obtaining various design alternatives for 
RTI messages. The LoA concept was introduced originally 
by Sheridan and Verplank (1978) to suggest a wide vari-
ety of automation modes that replace functions previously 
carried out by the human. It has been applied to various 
human–machine systems in the real world, such as teleopera-
tion, aviation, surface transport, nuclear and process plants, 
manufacturing, mobile robots (Inagaki 2005; Sheridan 1992; 
Endsley and Kaber 1999; Inagaki and Inoue 1993; Kaber 
and Endsley 2007; Lindstrom and Winroch 2010; Inagaki 
et al. 2007; Moray et al. 2000; Pacaux et al. 2011; Parasura-
man et al. 2000; Jou et al. 2009).
2.1  Levels of automation
Table 2 shows LoA in an 11-point scale, ranging from LoA 1 
through LoA 10, with LoA 6.5 (Inagaki et al. 1998) between 
LoA 6 and LoA 7 in the original 10-point scale defined in 
Sheridan (1992, 1999).
We believe that NHTSA (2013, 2016) and SAE (2014), 
which is an earlier version of (SAE 2016), confuse the more 
Table 1  SAE levels of driving automation (LoDA)
After (SAE 2016)
In (SAE 2016), dynamic driving task (DDT) is defined as a collection of the following five subtasks: (1) lateral vehicle motion control, (2) lon-
gitudinal vehicle motion control, (3) monitoring the driving environment via object and event detection, recognition, classification, and response 
preparation, (4) object and event response execution, (5) maneuver planning, and (6) enhancing conspicuity via lighting and gesturing, etc., in 
which (3) and (4) are referred to as object and event detection and response (OEDR)
Level of driving automation (LoDA) Definition
LoDA 1: driver assistance Automation performs either longitudinal or lateral vehicle motion control (on a sustained basis), but 
not complete object and event detection and response (OEDR)
LoDA 2: partial driving automation Automation performs both longitudinal and lateral vehicle motion control (on a sustained basis), but 
not complete OEDR
LoDA 3: conditional driving automation Automation performs the complete dynamic driving task (DDT), but not DDT fallback, within a 
limited operational design domain (ODD)
LoDA 4: high driving automation Automation performs the complete DDT and DDT fallback within a limited ODD
LoDA 5: full driving automation Automation performs the complete DDT and DDT fallback without ODD limitation
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general “levels of automation” and the “levels of driving 
automation” (explicit to driving) and use the phrases inter-
changeably. Some of the above-mentioned papers discussing 
the takeover-related issues inherit such a wording. However, 
as Tables 1 and 2 tell clearly, the two concepts are quite 
different and should be distinguished appropriately. In this 
paper, we analyze the differences in the implications of the 
scales, particularly at the LoA levels that seem to relate 
to LoDA 3. Our analysis shows that the LoA concept can 
deepen our understanding of LoDA, and the LoDA defini-
tion, on the other hand, can give an opportunity to re-realize 
the power of LoA.
2.2  Who is in authority?
In the concept of human-centered automation, it is usually 
assumed that the human is maintained as the final authority 
over the automation (Billings 1997; Sheridan 2002; Woods 
1989). LoAs positioned at 5 or below are compatible with 
the human-centered automation principle, because the 
human is always in authority. Aviation is a typical domain 
in which human-centered automation is accepted (Billing 
1997); see Example 1.
Example 1 The Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance Sys-
tem (TCAS) is an automated system to reduce risks of mid-
air collision by issuing resolution advisories (RA) with an 
aural message to tell the pilot whether to climb or descend. 
Although the pilot is expected to respect an RA, she may 
disobey it if there is a definite reason. The LoA of TCAS in 
this case is positioned at 4. When TCAS issues an RA, the 
pilot must disconnect the autopilot as well as the flight direc-
tors and then adjust the pitch attitude of the aircraft so that 
the vertical speed suggested by the RA may be attained. It 
is known that such a rarely used flying technique imposes a 
heavy burden on pilots (Botagargues 2009). For a TCAS that 
performs the maneuver recommended by the RA where the 
pilot expresses agreement with it, the LoA of such a TCAS 
can be said to correspond to LoA 5.
When the LoA is positioned at 6 or higher, the situation 
becomes different. In case of LoA 6, the automation allows 
the human a limited time to veto its proposed action. Here 
the automation executes the action if the allotted time passes 
while the human is dithering whether or not to veto. In this 
case, the human is not treated as the final authority over the 
automation. However, that does not mean that higher levels 
of automation are unnecessary. Even in aviation, as a matter 
of fact, such systems are in use to cope with situations in 
which immediate and precise control maneuvers are indis-
pensable to assure safety; see Examples 2–4, again based on 
experience in aviation technology.
Example 2 Some aircraft are equipped with an automated 
system that can cope with cabin decompression in a highly 
automatic manner (LoA 6). When the aircraft’s monitoring 
system detects unsafe cabin pressure, it gives the crew a 
warning and begins a countdown. If the crew neither can-
cels the warning nor applies any positive control action to 
the aircraft, the automation performs a side-step maneuver 
followed by an automatic rapid descent (Kaminski-Morrow 
2009).
Example 3 A new type of TCAS provides necessary infor-
mation and directives to the autopilot so that it can control 
the aircraft automatically and precisely as the RA demands, 
so as to avoid a mid-air collision (Botagargues 2009). The 
new TCAS does not need any human intervention, which 
means that LoA of the new TCAS is positioned at 6.5 or 
higher.
Example 4 The Thrust Asymmetry Compensation (TAC) for 
a twin-engine aircraft is an automated system with LoA 7. 
During a takeoff roll, TAC monitors engine data continually 
to determine the thrust level of each engine. If TAC detects 
Table 2  Levels of automation 
(LoA)
After Sheridan (1992, 1999), Inagaki et al. (1998)
LoA 1 The computer offers no assistance: the human must make all decisions and actions
LoA 2 The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or
LoA 3 narrows the selection down to a few, or
LoA 4 suggests one alternative, and
LoA 5 executes that suggestion if the human approves, or
LoA 6 allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or
LoA 6.5 executes automatically after telling the human what it is going to do, or
LoA 7 executes automatically, then necessarily informs humans, or
LoA 8 informs the human after execution only if asked, or
LoA 9 informs the human after execution only if it, the computer, decides to
LoA 10 The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the human
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a sufficient difference between the two engines, it automati-
cally controls the rudder to reduce skidding-off-runway 
accidents. The “rudder movement is back-driven through 
the rudder pedals and the rudder trim indicator to provide 
rudder control awareness to the pilot” (Boeing 2005).
2.3  Designing a request to intervene in driving
SAE J3016 (2016) defines that LoDA 3 performs the com-
plete DDT, but does not carry out DDT fallback. The auto-
mation issues a timely RTI to the DDT fallback-ready user 
when it determines that operational design domain limits are 
about to be exceeded or there is a DDT performance-relevant 
system failure. SAE J3016 (2016) does not specify RTI mes-
sages explicitly. However, it assumes that the automation 
disengages an appropriate time after issuing an RTI. A first 
candidate for an RTI message might thus be, “Intervene and 
resume driving within T seconds time,” which we here call 
Baseline.
In designing RTI messages, it would be realistic to 
assume that the driver either might not be receptive to an 
RTI or be ready to perform the fallback maneuver. This sec-
tion illustrates how design alternatives for an RTI can be 
obtained systematically by consulting Table 2.
LoAs that are positioned at either 3 or lower may be 
excluded from our discussion because they are not appropri-
ate for asking a single action to take (e.g., “resume driving”). 
For instance, LoA 3 is useful when the computer shows the 
human a few candidate actions so that she can pick up one 
among them. However, in our case of an RTI, there are no 
candidate actions other than to “resume driving.” LoA 4 is 
not useful, either, in designing an RTI message: Although 
the computer recommends the driver to “resume driving,” 
she has the right to disregard the recommendation to take a 
completely different action that she likes.
LoA 5 when applied to RTI automation implies an RTI 
message that asks the driver to intervene and resume driving 
within T seconds time. It also tells the driver that the auto-
mation disengages when it confirms that the driver resumes 
driving. Namely, the automation suggests the driver, “You 
intervene and resume driving. Then I disengage myself.” 
This means that the automation does not disengage when 
the driver does not respond to an RTI. The automation con-
tinues vehicle operation within its power to lead the vehicle 
possibly to a minimal risk condition (e.g., stopping on the 
road or the shoulder).
LoA 6 implies another design alternative of an RTI mes-
sage that asks the driver to intervene and resume driving 
within T seconds time. It also tells the driver that she may 
veto when she is not willing to resume driving due to her 
lack of confidence in taking care of the situation. If the RTI 
is vetoed, the automation continues vehicle operation to lead 
the vehicle to a minimal risk condition. If no response is 
given to the RTI, the automation disengages when T seconds 
have passed. In that case, neither the driver nor the automa-
tion controls the vehicle.
LoA 6.5 suggests a design alternative of an RTI mes-
sage that tells the driver to intervene and resume driving at 
once and that the automation is going to disengage shortly. 
If the driver fails to respond to the RTI in a timely manner, 
the vehicle is put into a condition in which nobody controls 
it. Even if the driver resumes driving, the driver’s vehicle 
operation may not be of adequate quality because the takeo-
ver time is extremely short.
LoAs positioned at either 7 or higher may not be suitable 
for an RTI message, because they do not communicate with 
the driver at all before the automation disengages.
Table 3 gives design alternatives for an RTI message that 
may be used in LoDA 3 of the SAE system.
3  Evaluating design of a request 
to intervene message
Table 4 summarizes the driver’s response to various RTI 
messages and consequences that may occur.
3.1  Expected utility for an RTI
Let P(RD|Baseline) denote the probability that the driver 
resumes driving (RD) after she is requested to intervene 
within T seconds time, and P(NR|Baseline) be the prob-
ability of no response (NR) to the request and thus the 
automation disengages when T seconds have passed. The 
driver’s response to the RTI is either RD or NR, namely 
P(RD|Baseline) + P(NR|Baseline) = 1. Let a denote the 
benefit of successful fallback by the driver, and c the cost 
arising out of the state in which the vehicle is controlled 
Table 3  Design alternatives of 
an RTI message for LoDA 3 LoA of RTI Message in RTI
LoA 5 “Intervene and resume driving within T seconds time. The automation disengages 
when it confirms that you have started vehicle operation.”
LoA 6 “Intervene and resume driving within T seconds time. Veto if you do not like to do so.”
LoA 6.5 “Intervene and resume driving at once. The automation disengages soon.”
Baseline “Intervene and resume driving within T seconds time.”
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neither by the automation nor the driver. The expected 
utility U(Baseline) for an RTI of Baseline type is given by:
Suppose the driver is given an RTI with LoA 5. Let 
P(RD|LoA 5) denote the probability that she resumes driv-
ing based on the RTI, and P(NR|LoA 5) be the probability 
that she gives no response and thus the automation tries 
to control the vehicle within its power, where P(RD|LoA 
5) + P(NR|LoA 5) = 1, since the driver’s response to the 
RTI is either RD or NR. By letting b denote the benefit of 
the fallback by the automation, we have:
If an RTI corresponds to LoA 6, the driver may veto when 
she is not willing to resume driving because of her lack of 
confidence in taking care of the situation. Let P(VT|LoA 
6) denote the probability that she vetoes (VT) the RTI. By 
distinguishing RD, VT and NR for her response to the RTI 
with LOA 6, we have:
where P(RD|LoA 6) + P(VT|LoA 6) + P(NR|LoA 6) = 1. 
Note that the values of a and b are the same in both (2) and 
(3).
For an RTI with LOA 6.5, the driver’s response to the 
RTI is either RD or NR. Then we have:
where P(RD|LoA 6.5) + P(NR|LoA 6.5) = 1, and a denotes 
the benefit of the driver’s fallback, the quality of which 
might be poor (i.e., a < a) because the takeover time is 
extremely short. Note that the value of c is the same in both 
(3) and (4).
(1)U(Baseline) = aP(RD|Baseline) − cP(NR|Baseline).
(2)U(LoA 5) = aP(RD|LoA 5) + bP(NR|LoA 5).
(3)
U(LoA 6) = aP(RD|LoA 6) + bP(VT|LoA 6) − cP(NR|LoA 6),
(4)U(LoA 6.5) = a−P(RD|LoA 6.5) − cP(NR|LoA 6.5),
3.2  Order relations among design alternatives 
for RTI
There are no differences among {Baseline, LoA 5, LoA 
6} as design alternatives for an RTI message from the 
viewpoint of information and time allowance given to the 
driver, which means that P(RD|Baseline) = P(RD|LoA 
5)  =  P(RD|LoA 6). In the case of an RTI with LoA 
6.5, the takeover time given to the driver is far shorter 
than any one of the above three cases, e.g., P(RD|LoA 
6.5) < P(RD|Baseline).
Thus, we have:
It is then straightforward to have the following order relation:
3.3  Is SAE conditional driving automation 
a sensible target to be aimed at?
What the order relation (6) implies may be summarized in 
the following six points.
(A) What is called “Baseline” in this paper is the RTI 
design that tells the driver simply to “Intervene and 
resume driving within T seconds time.” The automation 
disengages either when the driver resumes driving or 
when she gives no response for T seconds. The Baseline 
is the RTI message that is suggested in (SAE 2016). The 
order relation (6) shows that there exist design alterna-
tives for RTI messages that are better than the Baseline. 
In other words, the Baseline is not a reasonable target to 
translate into reality.
(B) Suppose that the automation issues an RTI of Base-
line type and the driver dithers over whether to intervene 
or not due to her lack of confidence in taking care of the 
(5)
P(NR|LoA 5) = P(VT|LoA 6) + P(NR|LoA 6)
= P(NR|Baseline) < P(NR|LoA 6.5).
(6)
U(LoA 6.5) < U(Baseline) < U(LoA 6) < U(LoA 5).
Table 4  Human response to an automation-issued RTI and consequences that may occur
LoA of RTI If the human accepted the RTI If the RTI was given no response or if RTI was vetoed in the case of LoA 6
LoA 5 The human resumes vehicle operation The automation may not disengage and must continue vehicle operation within 
its power to lead the vehicle possibly to a minimal risk condition
LoA 6 The human resumes vehicle operation If the RTI was vetoed, the automation continues vehicle operation within its 
power to lead the vehicle possibly to a minimal risk condition
If no response was given to the RTI, the automation disengages when T seconds 
have passed. Nobody controls the vehicle after that
LoA 6.5 The human resumes vehicle operation that may 
not be good in quality due to short takeover 
time
Nobody controls the vehicle because the automation disengages immediately 
after issuing the RTI
Baseline The human resumes vehicle operation The automation disengages when T seconds have passed. Nobody controls the 
vehicle after that
 Cognition, Technology & Work
1 3
situation. The only action she can take in that case may 
be to give no response to the RTI for more than T sec-
onds. The consequence would be that neither the driver 
nor the automation controls the vehicle. If the RTI were 
designed as the one with LoA 6, the driver can express 
explicitly that she cannot take over control by vetoing 
the RTI. Then the automation would lead the vehicle to a 
minimal risk condition. The quantity defined as [U(LoA 
6) – U(Baseline)] may be defined as the value of veto 
power.
(C) An optimal design among {Baseline, LoA 5, LoA 6, 
and LoA 6.5} is an RTI with LoA 5 that tells the driver to 
“Intervene and resume driving within T seconds time.” In 
this case the system disengages when it confirms that the 
driver has started vehicle operation. If the driver fails to 
respond to the RTI, the system continues vehicle opera-
tion within its power to act with minimal risk. Note that 
this type of RTI with LoA 5 is outside the reach of LoDA 
3 in (SAE 2016) which assumes that the DDT fallback 
should be performed by the driver, not by the automation.
(D) Is there any possibility that the RTI with LoA 5 
may be regarded as identical to LoDA 4 in Table 1? The 
answer is negative. It is defined in (SAE 2016) that LoDA 
4 must be able to perform DDT fallback without any 
expectation that the driver will respond to an RTI, and 
that the driver does not need to be receptive and respond 
to an RTI. Such a situation does not match what we dis-
cussed in Sect. 3.
(E) The facts pointed out so far indicate that Table 1 gives 
an incomplete list of LoDAs because an important level 
is missing between LoDA 3 and LoDA 4. Note that a 
candidate for filling in the missing level might be High 
Automation defined in (SAE 2014), the previous version 
of SAE J 3016 mentioned in (SAE 2016). It is defined 
that High Automation “will alert a human driver several 
seconds in advance of the need to resume the dynamic 
driving task (i.e., by issuing a request to intervene); how-
ever, the automated driving system is capable of restoring 
the vehicle to a minimal risk condition automatically if 
a human driver fails to resume the dynamic driving task 
when prompted” (SAE 2014). The High Automation in 
(SAE 2014) is different from LoDA 4 in (SAE 2016).
(F) There are two ways to solve the missing level problem. 
One is to place the SAE High Automation in (SAE 2014) 
between LoDA 3 and LoDA 4 in (SAE 2016). The other is 
to revise the definition of LoDA 3 so that the automation 
may perform DDT fallback when the driver fails to respond 
to the RTI. Otherwise, LoDA 3 in (SAE 2016) cannot be a 
technically sound target for development.
4  Request to intervene accompanied 
by automatic safety control
Suppose that LoDA 3 in SAE (2016) determines that the oper-
ational design domain limits are about to be exceeded or that 
there is a DDT performance-relevant system failure. The auto-
mation then issues an RTI and waits for the driver’s response. 
During that time, the vehicle approaches continually toward a 
critical point. However, if the automation applies some auto-
matic safety control action (such as partial braking) when an 
RTI is issued, the following benefits might be expected: (i) the 
automatic safety control action can be a trigger for the driver to 
sense situational changes and may improve her receptivity and 
response to the RTI, and (ii) the automatic safety control action 
can make the time to the critical point longer and may improve 
the driver’s performance by reducing her sense of panic.
This section investigates whether such automatic safety 
control is effective or not in a machine-initiated transfer of 
authority from the automation to the driver.
4.1  Expected utility for an RTI accompanied 
by an automatic safety control action
Let P(RD|Baseline, SC) denote the probability that the 
driver resumes driving based on an RTI of Baseline type 
which is accompanied by automatic safety control (SC), and 
P(NR|Baseline, SC) be the probability that no response is 
given to the RTI, where P(RD|Baseline, SC) + P(NR|Baseline, 
SC) = 1, since the driver’s response to the RTI is either RD or 
NR. Then the expected utility U(Baseline, SC) for an RTI of 
Baseline type is given by:
For an RTI with LoA 5 in which the driver’s response is 
either RD or NR, we have:
where P(RD|LoA 5, SC) + P(NR|LoA 5, SC) = 1.
In case of an RTI with LoA 6, we have:
w h e r e  P(RD|LoA 6, SC) + P(VT|LoA 6, SC)
+P(NR|LoA 6, SC) = 1.
For an RTI with LoA 6.5, we have:
where P(RD|LoA 6.5, SC) + P(NR|LoA 6.5, SC) = 1.
(7)
U(Baseline, SC) = aP(RD|Baseline, SC) − cP(NR|Baseline, SC).
(8)
U(LoA 5, SC) = aP(RD|LoA 5, SC) + bP(NR|LoA 5, SC),
(9)
U(LoA 6, SC) =aP(RD|LoA 6, SC) + bP(VT|LoA 6, SC)
− cP(NR|LoA 6, SC),
(10)
U(LoA 6.5, SC) = a
−
P(RD|LoA 6.5, SC) − cP(NR|LoA 6.5, SC),
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4.2  Effects of automatic safety control on design 
of RTI
It is natural to expect that automatic safety control would 
be effective in reducing the driver’s sense of panic, thus 
increasing chances for her to reach her own decision within 
T seconds time. As a matter of fact, if the vehicle slows 
down automatically when the automation issues an RTI, 
the driver might be a bit more relaxed to take over control, 
compared to the case in which the vehicle continues to move 
fast. To express such a situation, the following inequalities 
are introduced: P(RD|Baseline, SC) > P(RD|Baseline) for 
an RTI of the Baseline type, P(RD|LoA 5, SC) > P(RD|LoA 
5) for RTI with LoA 5, and P(RD|LoA 6, SC) > P(RD| LoA 
6), as well as P(VT|LoA 6, SC) > P(VT|LoA 6) for RTI with 
LoA 6. However, in case of RTI with LoA 6.5, the automatic 
safety control might not be effective in reducing the driver’s 
sense of panic because the automation disengages immedi-
ately, namely P(RD|LoA 6.5, SC) = P(RD|LoA 6.5).
It is easy to see that an automatic safety con-
trol is effective when coupled with an RTI of Base-
line type. Since P(RD|Baseline) + P(NR|Baseline) =
1 and P(RD|Baseline, SC) + P(NR|Baseline, SC) = 1, 
substitutions will yield:
In a similar manner, we have the following result in case of 
an RTI with LoA 6:
However, an RTI with LoA 6.5 can gain no benefit from 
automatic safety control. There is none because of the imme-
diate disengagement of the automation after issuing an RTI. 
Therefore,
In the case of an RTI with LoA 5, whether automatic 
safety control is effective varies depending on the sign of 
(a − b), because:
This may be rephrased as follows: (a) If the driver is more 
dependable than the automation in emergency situations, the 
coupling of an RTI with LoA 5 and automatic safety control 
is beneficial. (b) However, if the driver is less dependable 
(11)
U(Baseline, SC) − U(Baseline) = (a + c) {P(RD|Baseline, SC)
− P(RD|Baseline)} > 0.
(12)
U(LoA 6, SC) − U(LoA 6) = (a + c) {P(RD|LoA 6, SC)
− P(RD|LoA 6)} + (b + c) {P(VT|LoA 6, SC)
− P(VT|LoA 6)} > 0.
(13)
U(LoA 6.5, SC) − U(LoA 6.5) = (a
−
+ c){P(RD|LoA 6.5, SC)
− P(RD|LoA 6.5)} = 0.
(14)
U(LoA 5, SC) − U(LoA5) =
(a − b) {P(RD|LoA 5, SC) − P(RD|LoA 5)}.
than the automation in emergency situations, the automatic 
safety control can make a situation worse because it may 
cause the driver to perform poor fallback in emergencies.
This section has restricted the discussions only to the case 
in which the automatic safety control may be effective in 
reducing the driver’s sense of panic. However, the automatic 
safety control may be also effective to make the driver’s fall-
back maneuvers smoother. In such a case, the coefficient a 
may be replaced by a* where a* > a. On the other hand, the 
coefficient c may be replaced by c* in which c* < c, because 
the cost of a slower vehicle’s accident would be milder than 
that of a faster vehicle. Under this kind of assumption, similar 
results as (11)–(14) can be obtained but in a more favorable 
way to the automatic safety control. In order to avoid giving 
almost similar equations, this paper suppressed the discus-
sion of the case where the automatic safety control works to 
make the driver’s fallback maneuvers smoother.
4.3  Automatic safety control maintains the order 
relations among RTI design alternatives
Although automatic safety control can have effects on each 
of RTI design differently, it maintains the same order rela-
tion as (6):
The order relation (15) confirms that the points made in 
Sect. 3.3 are still valid. Figure 1 gives a summary of order 
relations among design alternatives for RTI messages, as 
well as effects of automatic safety control on the utility of 
each RTI design.
5  Concluding remarks
There are various ways to allocate DDT between the driver 
and the automation. Table 1 shows SAE’s five types of 
function allocation schema, ranging from LoDA 1 to 
LoDA 5. Among them, LoDA 3 is a dynamic function 
allocation in which some DDT tasks are transferred from 
the automation to the driver based on the decision of the 
automation. When necessary, the automation issues an RTI 
to the driver with an expectation that she notices it and 
accepts the trading of authority for vehicle control from 
the automation to her. Machine-initiated trading of author-
ity from the automation to the human is not easy though, 
even for cases of professional human operators, as the fol-
lowing example from aviation suggests.
Example 5 Air France Flight 447 crashed into the Atlantic 
Ocean in June 2009. While flying at an altitude of 35,000 
feet in an area of turbulence, the measured airspeed dropped 
(15)
U(LoA 6.5, SC) < U(Baseline, SC)
< U(LoA 6, SC) < U(LoA 5, SC).
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suddenly due to the obstruction of the Pitot probe by ice 
crystals. That caused disconnection of autopilot and auto-
thrust. The human pilot tried to control the aircraft in this 
unexpected event. However, he sometimes gave over-cor-
recting input to the aircraft. The aircraft finally stalled and 
did not recover (BEA 2011).
Sections 3 and 4 in this paper suggest that similar prob-
lems in trading of authority for highway vehicle control 
can happen in LoDA 3. The difficulty could be more severe 
than in the case of aircraft, because most automobile driv-
ers are non-professionals and their knowledge/skills for 
using automation may not be adequate.
This paper has proven mathematically that LoDA 3 
may not be a meaningful target to be translated into real-
ity, because it is risky to hand over control authority to a 
driver who has not been actively involved in DDT while 
the automation is engaged. It is claimed in this paper that 
a reasonable way to put LoDA 3 into reality is to revise its 
definition so that automation can continue vehicle control 
when no RTI response is given by the driver in a timely 
manner. The resulting definition of LoDA 3 would be 
almost equivalent to that of the High Automation given 
in SAE (2014).
Another possible and promising alternative to make 
LoDA 3 sufficiently attractive may be to use the haptic 
shared control in the phase of trading of authority for vehi-
cle control from the automation to the driver in the situation 
where the automation issued an RTI. The concept of haptic 
shared control itself is broad, and there are many application 
domains (see, e.g., Abbink et al. 2012 and Flemisch et al. 
2012 for overviews). Haptic shared control allows the human 
operator to communicate with the automation through forces 
on the control interface. An important concept in haptic 
shared control is the level of haptic authority (LoHA), which 
describes “how forceful the human-automation interface 
connects the human input to automation inputs” (Abbink 
et al. 2012). By selecting an appropriate LoHA, a new level 
of automation can be obtained in the scale ranging from full 
automation to full manual control. Moreover, LoHA may be 
changeable dynamically either in the machine-initiated man-
ner or in the human-initiated manner (Abbink et al. 2012; 
Flemisch et al. 2012).
By noting that the driver may not be good at taking on 
authority from the automation after enjoying automated 
driving over a period of time, we have to ask whether it is 
possible to let the automation collaborate with the driver 
during the process of trading of authority for vehicle con-
trol. A natural answer to the question may be to apply the 
LoHA concept to the authority trading process and change 
it flexibly and dynamically depending on the situation when 
trading of authority for vehicle control is in progress from 
the automation to the driver. Wada and his colleagues have 
proposed a “shared authority mode that connects the auto-
mated and human driving modes” for LoDA 3 (Wada et al. 
2016; Wada and Kondo 2017). There are similar research 
topics, such as, “Can a machine-initiated method for vari-
able authority cause conflict of intentions, automation sur-
prises, or distrust of automation?” or “Can a human-initi-
ated method increase the driver’s burden?” or “Are there 
any tradeoffs when we use just a portion of possible ranges 
for LoHA?” These questions are closely related to issues of 
machine-initiated trading of authority in adaptive automa-
tion (Inagaki 2003; Inagaki and Sheridan 2012; Inagaki et al. 
2007) and human-initiated trading of authority in adaptable 
automation (Opperman 1994; Scerbo 2001). Extensive stud-
ies are necessary to help the driver in the phase of trading of 
authority upon RTI.
if 
a > b
if 
a < b
LoA 5 
SC
LoA 6 
LoA 5 
SC
LoA 6 
SC
Baseline 
SC
LoA 6.5 
SC
Baseline LoA 5 LoA 6.5 
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automatic
safety control
Utility of RTI without
automatic
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Fig. 1  Order relation among design alternatives for an RTI message
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